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Foundations of multi-agent learning:
Introduction to the special issue
In the last twenty years the literature on multi-agent learning has grown and flourished. Surveying it, one may
wonder if the result is a well tended garden or a collection of hardy weeds. The opening essay of this special issue—
by Shoham, Powers, and Grenager (SPG)—reflects directly on this question. SPG observe that researchers from
both AI and game theory investigate situations involving learning by multiple agents, but from a range of apparently
inconsistent motivating perspectives and assumptions. The difference in perspectives is to be expected, of course.
Generally speaking, AI researchers approach “multi-agent learning” (MAL) as an extension of (single-agent) machine
learning, accounting for special issues presented by the strategic environment. Game theorists start from strategic
decision making, and typically add learning in order to provide a dynamic account of coordinated behavior.
In consequence, MAL is not a commonly defined problem, and SPG further argue that it is not necessarily clear
how the aims of MAL research could or should be formulated. SPG aim to clarify the possibilities by organizing the
literature in terms of five alternative agenda, and argue that work motivated by one agenda may not be particularly
compelling with respect to another. Thus, research in MAL should more explicitly state and justify the questions it
addresses, and ultimately be judged with respect to the agenda in which these questions are meaningful.
In discoursing on the agenda, SPG also convey their own views on the fit of particular MAL research threads into
the agenda, and the relative importance of some of these threads.
The remainder of the special issue comprises a collection of commentaries by active MAL researchers, divided
roughly equally among AI researchers and game theorists. The respondents take on the issues raised by SPG in
a variety of ways. Some agree in parts, fleshing out the details. Others differ on the importance of the alternative
agenda, or raise research questions that may not fit neatly into the proposed categories. In combination, they provide
a stimulating and critical overview of the area.
The papers in this issue divide naturally into two groups. In the first group are papers that take a broad view of the
questions raised by SPG. The second group of papers focus on and respond to SPG on very particular issues.
The first paper of the first group, by Fudenberg and Levine, provides an economist perspective on the issues raised
by SPG. The second paper, by Sandholm, addresses numerous specific points from a computer science perspective,
emphasizing especially the need to clarify and refine the prescriptive agenda, proposing several salient distinctions. In
the third paper, Gordon proposes two additional research agenda, which he labels design and modeling. He points out
that defining formal representations of multi-agent interactions in which agents learn and reason is itself a research
problem, and in some cases we may be able to facilitate MAL through express design of multi-agent environments.
The paper by Stone cautions against an overly narrowly focus on the game-theoretic framework for MAL. He argues
that game-theoretic analysis has not been particularly useful for understanding many complex multi-agent environ-
ments, and such complex domains need to be addressed from a broader perspective. The fifth paper in this group,
by Tuyls and Parsons, suggests that evolutionary game theory (EGT) has much to offer MAL, and argues that from
the EGT perspective, the agendas proposed by SPG cannot be clearly separated. They therefore maintain the need
for cross-cutting research efforts. Rounding out this group is the paper by Mannor and Shamma. These authors dis-
cuss MAL from the perspective of designing distributed systems, raising some of the same concerns as Gordon, and
foreshadowing some points brought out in the papers focusing on specific issues (e.g., Young, Chang, and Zinkevich
et al.).
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364 R.V. Vohra, M.P. Wellman / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 363–364Turning to the second group of papers, Erev and Roth illustrate, by example, the insight about MAL to be gained
from experiments with human subjects. Young focuses on MAL with respect to the specific sense of learning equilib-
rium, and delineates the possible from the impossible.
On the subject of learning algorithms in MAL, Chang focuses specifically on the SPG discussion of no-regret
approaches, demonstrating that these have a wider scope of applicability than sometimes thought. Motivated also by
the no-regret discussion in SPG, Zinkevich et al. highlight the assumptions in opponent behavior assumed by the
basic no-regret approaches. They consider a richer class of opponent behavior and propose an explicit hierarchy of
MAL problems defined by the performance guarantees they provide, and the class of opponent agents for which the
guarantees apply. Finally, Monderer and Tennenholtz discuss the notion of what kind of learning algorithms one would
expect to emerge from strategic considerations.
Overall, the commentaries serve to confirm the premise of SPG, namely that MAL encompasses a multiplicity of
problems, some unrelated but some strongly connected. In editing this special issue, we also reinforced our sense that
a talented community of researchers is addressing MAL problems with a diverse set of promising tools. We hope that
bringing out this provocative essay by SPG with a collection of thoughtful commentaries will help to clarify research
questions and facilitate progress in the field.
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